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Abstract: I will expose and discuss Arendt’s genealogical 
account of the contemporary understanding of the human 
affairs and her critiques to a technocratic conception of 
politics which nowadays holds sway. Politics was for Ar-
endt originally meant to be the place where men can 
manifest their individuality through speeches and deeds 
which can affect the life of the community, as actually 
happened in the public sphere of the polis, where citizens 
could meet and discuss as equals. Starting from Plato, the 
philosophical thought, modelled on the idea of logical and 
natural necessity, refused to acknowledge the peculiar sta-
tus of public life and looked for universally valid criteria 
and ends according to which the city or the state should 
be shaped anew. The politician was no more a citizen tak-
ing part into public confrontation and became a skilled 
technician who can operate according to his abstract prin-
ciples: the core moment of politics, rather than debate, 
becomes legislation. The existence of a plurality of men is 
obscured by the concept of a human nature which should 
allow to know, foresee and manipulate human behaviour. 
While praising Arendt’s rehabilitation of participative 
politics and positive liberty, I will criticise her dismissal 
of the traditional framework insofar it remains necessary 
to edify and maintain a well-articulated institutional and 
social context which allows freedom to be possible with-
out disappearing in a short time or to remain a privilege of 
a number of happy few. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Arendt famously blamed Plato for having started a 
philosophical tradition which, by subjugating politics to 
ontology, has radically misunderstood the nature of poli-
tics and more generally of the human world1. In doing so, 
Plato would have implicitly contributed to the disappear-
ance of the public space which characterized the experi-
ence of the Greek polis. Arendt strongly opposes the 
understanding of politics as a problem-solving technique 
that aims at conforming the social reality to a predeter-
mined standard, which science should be able to dictate. 
Politics, according to this framework, should be a matter 
only for experts who have been taught how to implement 
the common good. This technocratic conception of poli-
tics has become quite commonly held. We see, in Ar-
endt’s words «the body of peoples and political communi-
ties in the image of a family whose everyday affairs have 
to be taken care of by a gigantic, nation-wide administra-
tion of housekeeping»2. Echoes of this vision can be 
easily found in the rhetoric of ‘there is no alternative3‘ 
that is often employed nowadays to defend (and to put 
outside of a serious debate) neoliberal-oriented policies: 
governments, in order not to fail, should do ‘homework’, 
take advice from commissions of ‘wise men’, and follow 
prescribed ‘recipes’ and ‘cures’. The most important deci-
sions, as a much celebrated former Italian Prime Minister 
once stated, must be «protected from the electoral pro-
cess»4. 
 Far from being just the product of the recent circum-
stances, this approach to politics has a very long history. 
Arendt’s genealogical account traces it back to Plato: by 
showing that this conception of politics originated from a 
serious misunderstanding of the peculiar status, meaning 
and goals of the human affairs, Arendt wishes to rehabili-
tate a different understanding of politics5, which was ex-
perienced in the life of the Greek polis (and, in modern 
times, in sporadic resurgence of participative experiences 
during revolutions). Politics was not meant to be a profes-
sion exercised by an élite of skilled technicians, but was 
conceived as the possibility of every citizen to realise 
himself as an individual recognised by a community of 
peers. Such an experience could be secured only by the 
participation to public life, where men could manifest 
themselves as free individualities able to display their dif-
ferences on a ground of equality. 
 
 
2. The Stages of the Human Condition 
 
We can have a better understanding of these statements 
by keeping in mind Arendt’s phenomenology of practical 
life as she describes it in her magnum opus, The Human 
Condition (1958). For Arendt practical life is made up of 
three different categories which reflects all the possible 
interactions men can establish between them, nature and 
the world: labour, work and action. 
 1) With labour Arendt means the activities required 
for the self-preservation and reproduction of human life. 
Through labour, men struggle to satisfy their needs 
through in order to simply preserve their biological func-
tions as other animals do. They act as slaves of a natural 
necessity. Their life is entirely spent in the meaningless 
cycle of a process which alternates «toiling and resting, 
labouring and consuming, with the same happy and pur-
poseless regularity with which day and night and life and 
death follow each other»6. Thus, everyone simply behaves 
as a member of an animal species, to the point that Arendt 
employs the expression animal laborans (labouring ani-
mal) to define this way of life. 
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 The forms of organisation established with the pur-
pose of securing the survival and the propagation of the 
species presuppose from the beginning a hierarchical 
structure and the division of roles. This was the case of 
family, which Aristotle defined as the first natural society: 
men are supposed to earn nourishments and women to 
generate and rise children, and for this reason, women 
must be subordinated to men7. 
 2) But human life is not entirely determined by nature: 
the form of intercourse between man and nature does not 
consists just in toil and consumption, but also in a purpos-
ive transformation of the environment and in the con-
struction of lasting items, which allow us to emancipate 
ourselves from the rhythms dictated by nature itself. Men 
can, for example, build shelters and walls to protect them-
selves from bad weather and wild animals. Against the 
instability of a cyclical nature, which destroys everything 
it gives life to, the homo faber edifies a stable and solid 
reality where human existence can safely take place. Un-
like animals, men are able to build tools and artefacts to 
serve their purposes. The fabrication process involves the 
transformation of matter according to projects, models 
and purposes, which the artisan has in mind. He begins 
with an idea and ends with a product as compliant as pos-
sible to the imagined object. While the animal laborans is 
slave of necessity, the homo faber is fully master of him-
self and of his work, which follows directly from his plan. 
Matter can be employed as a means to craft instruments, 
and these instruments, in turn, can serve our purposes. 
Nature is shaped by the homo faber, «lord and master of 
the whole earth»8 unto a world of items which have for us 
a signification as employable tools. 
 Although the homo faber can give purpose to the 
world, he is still unable to find a meaning for himself: the 
categories of instrumentality and of utility, through which 
he interprets things, suggest a regressio ad infinitum in 
the search of a final end, which should not become, in 
turn, a means for something else. Homo faber’s mind-set 
cannot provide this final end: he can employ his creative 
force either to empower the animal laborans, by offering 
him the instruments to increase his productivity and to 
make him dispose of more and more consumption goods, 
or to predispose the stage on which the last component of 
the human condition can take place: action. 
  3) While in the sphere of labour men simply be-
have like all the other animals, and in the domain of work 
they are barely executors of plans whose ultimate goals 
remain unknown and unquestioned, in the sphere of ac-
tion they can finally appear as individuals, equal and dif-
ferent at the same time. Once they are emancipated from 
the tyranny of natural needs and protected from a hostile 
environment, men can finally reunite as equals in a com-
munity where nobody has to govern or be governed. Now 
existence receives a meaning in so far as each man is re-
cognised by others not merely as something fungible and 
interchangeable, but as a peculiar individual, bearer of a 
unique point of view upon a common reality9. According 
to Arendt, men are not instantiations of a common human 
nature, but, when they are freed from natural necessity 
and do not act in a exclusively instrumental behaviour, a 
plurality of persons, whose difference emerges because 
they act and talk differently from each other. In being not 
qualified by properties or skills, individuals can reveals 
themselves only through what they do and say. Action is 
the power that enables each and every man to start some-
thing new, unexpected and unpredictable, and which 
makes history irreducible to a set of laws or to a pre-
determined process:  
 
The new always happens against the overwhelming odds of stat-
istical laws and their probability, which for all practical, every-
day purposes amounts to certainty; the new therefore always 
appears in the guise of a miracle. The fact that man is capable of 
action means that the unexpected can be expected from him, that 
he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable. And this 
again is possible only because each man is unique, so that with 
each birth something uniquely new comes into the world. With 
respect to this somebody who is unique it can be truly said that 
nobody was there before10. 
 
While the effect of work is always predictable, an action 
never completely reflects the intentions of the agent be-
cause it immediately falls «into an already existing web of 
human relationships, with its innumerable, conflicting 
wills and intentions». 
 Since action is unpredictable, we can just form an 
opinion on what is actually happening and going to hap-
pen, without any possibility to appeal to an apodictic cer-
tainty and truth. We can judge situations only from our 
point of view, which is also unique as our faculty to act. 
We can only form opinions (doxa, from dokei moi, ‘it 
seems to me’) about social facts: the same reality can ac-
tually appear very different to different observers. Our 
perspective can be enriched only by the confrontation 
with others by means of speech, which becomes crucial 
for a better understanding of the social. As Kant already 
observed11, freedom of thought without freedom of 
speech would be meaningless: 
 
Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by con-
sidering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making 
present to my mind the stand-points of those who are absent; 
that is, I represent them. […] The more people’s standpoints I 
have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, 
and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were 
in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for representative 
thinking and the more valid my final conclusion, my opinion12. 
 
In absence of an unequivocal truth, we lack of a criterion 
to impose our point of view to others: we can just try to 
persuade them by «courting their judgment», Arendt says 
quoting Kant’s Critique of Judgment13, namely by sug-
gesting that our perspective can better reflect the state of 
things we are both observing, but without being able to 
offer a definitive proof14. In so far we treat men as human 
beings, and not as tools, we cannot use neither logic (ob-
viously as long as we are discussing human affairs and 
not mathematics and natural sciences) nor violence to 
make them agree with us, but we have to persuade them. 
Influencing people through persuasion is the essence of 
power, which is therefore the opposite of violence. If men 
were all the same, Arendt argues, there would be no need 
to communicate our thoughts nor to act in order to show 
others who we are: 
 
Human plurality, the basic condition of both action and speech 
has the twofold character of equality and distinction. If men 
were not equal, they could neither understand each other and 
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those who came before them nor plan for the future and foresee 
the needs of those who will come after them. If men were not 
distinct, each human being distinguished from any other who is, 
was, or will ever be, they would need neither speech nor action 
to make themselves understood15. 
 
Deeds and speeches cannot for Arendt be reduced to mere 
instrumental or strategic behaviour: in that case, she says, 
they would be easily replaced by violence and by a purely 
symbolic and formalized language. We engage in them 
because they allow us to reveal ourselves, and in this con-
sists for Arendt the greatest self-fulfilment men can 
achieve: «we believe that the joys and gratifications of 
free company are to be preferred to the doubtful pleasures 
of holding dominion»16. 
 The distinction between work and action, poiesis and 
praxis lies, as Aristotle said, in the fact that the first is 
persecuted in order to achieve something else, the second 
for its own sake. We can renounce to labour (the citizens 
of the polis could do this thanks to the institution of slav-
ery), and to work and still be considered proper human 
beings, but a life deprived of the faculty to act and talk 
does not differ from the life of a beast or the functioning 
of a machine. The Greeks understood the necessity of ac-
tion for a meaningful life and instituted the polis as public 
space for this purpose. The Greeks considered as really 
human only those who, despising their natural existence, 
«prefer immortal fame to mortal things». The others 
«content with whatever pleasures nature will yield them, 
live and die like animals». Politics was the realm where 
everyone could reveal himself and achieve immortality 
through great deeds and speeches, thus artificially secur-
ing for the individual what nature had reserved only for 
the species. For the Greeks the polis was «first of all their 
guarantee against the futility of individual life, the space 
protected against this futility and reserved for the relative 
permanence, if not immortality, of mortals»17. Men could 
show themselves only in the stable background edified by 
the homo faber, and then be remembered by another kind 
of homo faber, the author of poems and songs about the 
glory of heroes. 
 The civic virtue which deeds and speeches can express 
was well distinguished from a technical skill or a particu-
lar knowledge, and regarded as a possession of every 
man, as it is well attested by the myth told by Protagoras 
in the homonymous platonic dialogue, where Zeus rec-
ommend Hermes to give everybody the political art18. 
 Plurality, unpredictability of human action, the epis-
temological status of political judgments, the consensual 
nature of power, the use of persuasion in order to achieve 
it and the quest for immortality through action are thus 
the characteristics of the political life Arendt traces in the 
polis. Plato would have waged war against these features 
of public life in his project of a philosophical reform of 
politics, a war which was indeed well motivated by the 
peculiar status of the contemplative life philosophy had 
discovered and by the relation it had to engage with prac-
tical life. 
 
 
3. The Nature of Philosophy 
 
 Philosophy was born for Arendt, which follows 
Plato’s and Aristotle’s own account of the origin of this 
discipline, out of an act of wonder in respect of the exist-
ence of things. It is a solitary act through which the 
thinker confronts himself with the meaning of the whole 
universe. Philosophy begins with an awareness of this in-
visible harmonious order of the kosmos, which is manifest 
in the midst of the familiar visibilities as though these had 
become transparent19. The philosopher suddenly realises 
that existence of things requires a necessary and eternal 
ground, otherwise it would be impossible. The task the 
philosopher decides to accomplish is to make this neces-
sary ground, which Parmenides first called Being, acces-
sible to reason. But in order to do this, the philosopher has 
to turn away from the world of the simple opinion, which 
accept appearances as such, without questioning them and 
without needing an ultimate ground to justify them. He 
must turn his gaze to what is eternal and to what is closer 
to eternity: the cyclical motions of celestial bodies and the 
unchangeable necessity of mathematical objects. The phi-
losopher’s gift, writes Plato, is to grasp «the eternal and 
unchangeable», while the others keep wandering «in the 
region of the many and variable»20. 
The philosopher discovers another way to secure immor-
tality that is not exposed to the risk of being forgotten, 
unlike the memory action leaves before itself. He will re-
ject the glory the city is able to grant to those who contri-
bute to its common life and will try to assimilate himself 
to the eternity of the highest realities. 
 While the agent aspires to leave a mark into the world 
history, to impress the seal of his linear existence into the 
cycle of nature, the philosopher completely annihilates his 
individuality to become one with the universal order. He 
accepts it as it is, and glorifies it as necessary. Instead of 
the instable motion and unpredictability of action, he 
chooses the everlasting quiet that is proper of contempla-
tion. 
 Differently from doxa, truth requires no collective ef-
fort in order to be discovered, and it cannot be subject to 
any protestation: it requires the individual capacity to see 
things as they are and necessarily are (something which 
imposes itself as self-evident), and to make logical infer-
ences starting from it. 
 Plato and Aristotle knew for sure that the world of 
human affairs was rooted in opinion and contingency: be-
cause of this Plato held it in low consideration, and Aris-
totle distinguished between theoria, the capacity to con-
template things as they are, and phronesis, practical wis-
dom. Assuming the incompatibility between common 
sense and the “world turned upside down”, that the phi-
losopher discovers through contemplation, we could 
therefore imagine that thinkers could simply decide to ab-
stain from politics in order to freely pursue their bios 
theoretikos. 
 Heraclitus, for example, renounced his aristocratic 
rights in favour of his brother in order to undertake his 
philosophical research without constraints. Aristotle 
clearly acknowledged the uselessness and unsuitability of 
the philosopher for public affairs21. Then, why did Plato 
feel the need to interfere with public life? An easy answer 
could lie in the episode of Socrates’ death and in the need 
of the philosopher to protect himself from the crowd by 
making the city the most suitable place for his contempla-
tion. 
PLATO, ARENDT AND THE CONDITIONS OF POLITICS 
 15 
Plato was indeed shocked by the public condemnation of 
his greatest teacher, but it would be a mistake to interpret 
the Republic as a reaction to the hostility of the city to-
wards contemplative life: 
 
There are hardly any instances on record of the many on their 
own initiative declaring war on philosophers. As far as the few 
and the many are concerned, it has been rather the other way 
round. It was the philosopher who of his own accord quitted the 
city of men and then told those he had left behind that, at best, 
they were deceived by the trust they had put in their senses, by 
their willingness to believe the poets and be taught by the popu-
lace, when they should have been using their minds, and that, at 
worst, they were content to live only for sensual pleasure and to 
be glutted like cattle.22 
 
Socrates, whom Plato had seen as the proof of the hos-
tility of the city towards the thinker, never thought of 
himself to possess wisdom of the kind philosophers usu-
ally claimed for themselves. For Arendt his vocation was 
a political one. He questioned everybody’s opinions, not 
to destroy them or to replace them with truth, but to verify 
their coherence and test their resistance to discussion: 
 
The role of the philosopher, then, is not to rule the city but to be 
its ‘gadfly’, not to tell philosophical truths but to make citizens 
more truthful. The difference with Plato is decisive: Socrates did 
not want to educate the citizens so much as he wanted to im-
prove their doxai, which constituted the political life in which he 
too took part. To Socrates, maieutic was a political activity, a 
give and take, fundamentally on a basis of strict equality, the 
fruits of which could not be measured by the result of arriving at 
this or that general truth.23 
 
Socrates still saw the root of all possible truths in doxa: in 
his admission to know only that he knew nothing «he had 
accepted the limitations of truth for mortals, its limitations 
through dokein, appearances, and because he at the same 
time, in opposition to the Sophists, had discovered that 
doxa was neither subjective illusion nor arbitrary distor-
tion but, on the contrary, that to which truth invariably 
adhered». He was sentenced to death not because he tried 
to divert men from their affairs in order to lead them to-
wards the truth, but because he tried to awake in the peo-
ple a moral conscience (the maxim to act in order to be 
always in harmony with ourselves) which could exhort to 
disobey the laws and not to respect the opinions com-
monly shared by the city. In contrast, Plato, who believed 
in the existence of an eternal truth to be grasped through 
philosophy, refused to value opinion at all: God, and not 
men, should be the measure of all things24. Still believing 
in the public role of the philosopher, as his master did, he 
nonetheless introduced a highest goal for his existence 
which was different from the self-fulfilment in the public 
space (which Socrates, according to Arendt, never ques-
tioned): the assimilation to the divine reality. 
 By doing this, Plato was forced to redefine the end of 
politics itself. Since the only possibility to have a mean-
ingful life consists in the vision of truth, politics must be 
degraded to a means, whose goal should be to secure that 
the life of the philosopher does not meet any obstacle. 
Like the man of action is not able to understand the end 
and meaning of the contemplative life because he keeps 
judging it within the standards of politics, in the same 
way the philosopher’s transfigured mind becomes unable 
to recognise any intrinsic value in political action. This 
insurmountable misunderstanding is fairly depicted in 
Plato’s famous myth of the cave. The only occupation 
which the cave dwellers are able to undertake is contem-
plation, although not of things as they really are, but just 
of shadows, which they try to guess what they stand for: 
 
It belongs to the puzzling aspects of the allegory of the cave that 
Plato depicts its inhabitants as frozen, chained before a screen, 
without any possibility of doing anything or communicating 
with one another. Indeed, the two politically most significant 
words designating human activity, talk and action (lexis and 
praxis), are conspicuously absent from the whole story. The 
only occupation of the cave dwellers is looking at the screen; 
they obviously love seeing for its own sake, independent from 
all practical needs. The cave dwellers, in other words, are de-
picted as ordinary men, but also in that one quality which they 
share with philosophers: they are represented by Plato as poten-
tial philosophers, occupied in darkness and ignorance with the 
one thing the philosopher is concerned with in brightness and 
full knowledge. The allegory of the cave is thus designed to de-
pict not so much how philosophy looks from the viewpoint of 
politics but how politics, the realm of human affairs, looks from 
the viewpoint of philosophy.25 
 
 From this perspective, the cave dwellers must be seen 
as fully incapable of successfully accomplish what they 
are supposed to do (knowing), and the philosopher must 
feel entitled to offer them guidance to the vision they 
couldn’t obtain in any way, except under his leadership. 
Everybody (in the philosopher’s eye) desires, without 
knowing it properly, the same good the philosopher has 
been able to find. Men living according to opinion are 
compared to people on a ship who are looking for a good 
captain but do not acknowledge that this role requires a 
great amount of competence26.  
 The city must be then modelled by the philosopher 
and made conform to the eternal reality he is able to 
grasp. This is actually the modus operandi of work, which 
in this way takes the place of action as key category of 
political philosophy. Men, like the clay employed by the 
artisan, must be shaped according to the idea of justice 
and of good in order to reproduce in the city the same 
harmony which inhabits the whole kosmos. Men must be 
forced, for their own good, to accept it, either after being 
instructed to see the same truth philosophers see (or a sur-
rogate of it), or through violence or menaces of punish-
ment in the afterlife like those Socrates employs in the 
concluding myths both of the Republic and Gorgias. The 
same discipline the philosopher must impose upon him-
self in order to be apt to contemplate, by subjugating body 
and desires, must be replicated in bigger scale in the city 
by subjugating the citizens who are unable to reach the 
truth: philosophers must give order or institute laws. In 
other words, they must become kings. 
 In the Laws, indeed, Plato more prudently opted, in-
stead of the direct rule by philosopher-kings, for «the 
construction of the public space in the image of a fabrica-
ted object», where «the compelling factor lies not in the 
person of the artist or craftsman but in the impersonal ob-
ject of his art or craft»27. The core moment of politics, ra-
ther than debate or common commitment to the same 
cause, becomes legislation according to a concept of a 
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human nature which should allow to know, foresee and 
manipulate human behaviour. This step will have lasting 
effect in the political thought, even after the meaning of a 
contemplative life went completely lost with the scientific 
revolution and the advent of modernity. 
 Politics continued to be seen as a means for a superior 
end, even by philosophers who, like Aristotle, clearly dis-
tinguished between the life of the philosopher and the one 
of the politician. Also for him the main feature of politics 
is the difference between those who govern and those 
who are governed. The superior end assigned to politics 
can change with the ages or with the personal understand-
ing of the philosopher, but the paradigm remains un-
changed: in the Middle-Age we find politics to be a 
means for the salvation of souls, for safety in Hobbes, for 
protection of life and property rights in Locke and in the 
liberal tradition, for the enhancement of productivity and 
progress in the contemporary political economy. 
 Also in modern times politics kept being identified 
with the art of governing men through laws. For example 
in Hobbes’ Leviathan the sovereign is identified with the 
legislator, be it a monarch or an assembly, in Rousseau’s 
social contract the main aim of the general will is also 
legislation, and politics’ goal is to reunite men under 
laws. For both Rousseau and Kant liberty consists in 
obedience to the same laws we have given consent to. The 
paradigm Arendt criticises, pertains thus both to antiquity, 
where laws were modelled on the immutable structure of 
kosmos, and modernity, where laws are the result of pro-
cedures developed by man himself. 
 Not less ubiquitous between antiquity and modernity 
is the need to evade from this paradigm in order to re-
cover a meaningful existence outside theoretical life 
(which has for Arendt become impossible in our modern 
conception of the physical world, which is no more seen 
as a self-structured order, but as a mathematical construc-
tion superimposed over an otherwise chaotic reality) and 
the simple and meaningless reproduction of the biological 
process in a consumerist life. 
 Despite being ignored by theory, the experience of an 
authentic public life has for Arendt temporarily re-
emerged after classical antiquity in the revolutionary 
movements starting from the XVIII century (the Ameri-
can and the French Revolution, the Paris Commune, the 
experience of the Soviets during the Russian Revolution, 
the movement of Resistance against Nazism during the 
Second World War, the Hungarian Uprising, the Protests 
of 1968), in a spirit of participation and commitment to a 
common enterprise through the constitution of councils, 
assemblies and other forms of public debate28. This ‘lost 
treasure of revolutions’ certainly testifies the importance 
of positive liberty as condition for a meaningful life, and 
its rehabilitation by Arendt is crucial in our times, where a 
technocratic conception of politics, this time dictated (as 
Arendt had already recognized) no more by philosophers 
but by political economists, holds sway. 
Nevertheless, Arendt seems to ignore that the sphere of 
praxis is not self-subsistent, but requires a well-
articulated institutional and social context which allows 
people to become individuals and not to remain victims of 
natural needs and of alienated work; otherwise political 
freedom is doomed to disappear in a very short time (as in 
the revolutionary experience) or to remain a privilege of a 
number of happy few, like in the Greek polis. 
 Arendt’s condemnation of the efforts to secure social 
justice (which, she believed, could be reached only 
through the development of technical progress) together 
with freedom, proves itself to be absolutely superficial 
and naive, especially when she has to recognise that even 
the American Revolution, which she has exalted for being 
free from that concern, has failed to achieve a durable re-
publican and truly participative spirit29. 
 For us who live in a deeply impolitic age, our com-
mitment must be the one of the homo faber aiming at 
looking for the necessary conditions which can make 
liberty something lasting. The problem of the institution 
of a true and lasting participative freedom cannot be 
thought outside the ‘Platonic’ (and Hobbesian) frame-
work: as a matter of establishing ends and individuating 
adequate means which can make life worth living. A po-
litical thought for ‘dark times’ cannot be emancipated 
from this tradition because the freedom, Arendt rightly 
asks for, requires a foundation which only legislation and 
a fair socio-economic environment can grant and ensure. 
The Greeks were well aware of this, as Arendt shows: 
 
Before men began to act, a definite space had to be secured and 
a structure built where all subsequent actions could take place, 
the space being the public realm of the polls and its structure the 
law; legislator and architect belonged in the same category.30 
 
Politics, as Arendt conceived it, will be possible only in a 
more just and equal social order which is our task to think 
and project. Politics as legislation and social struggle can 
still have a value if it is thought as means for the advent 
of a stable public life, namely the ‘kingdom of freedom’, 
which also a good part of the philosophical tradition ac-
knowledged to be situated beyond the borders of the sim-
ple wellbeing we can enjoy in private life and to be found 
in a shared enterprise. 
 I obviously do not mean to rehabilitate an authoritar-
ian government, neither by philosopher-kings nor by a 
revolutionary avant-garde, in order to secure this objec-
tive. A rehabilitation of reason, not as thought of Being or 
as source of eternal truths, but as the power to create a 
meaning for our being in the world (as Arendt praises it in 
The Life of the Mind by drawing from Kant the opposition 
of thinking and knowing31), could be enough. Such a rea-
son, as a point of view of the whole humanity, should be 
able to think a more just and equal social order and to re-
mind mankind that the human condition does not exhaust 
itself in the present state of things. To those who object 
that every change is impossible because man is bound by 
an unchangeable nature or is the result of historical neces-
sity, we must be able to answer in the same way Kant did 
in Toward Perpetual Peace: 
 
Such a pernicious theory itself produces the trouble it predicts, 
throwing human beings into one class with other living ma-
chines, which need only be aware that they are not free in order 
to become, in their own judgment, the most miserable of all be-
ings in the world32. 
 
The recollection which Arendt accomplishes in her ac-
count of the Greek polis and also of the revolutionary tra-
dition in Modern Age, can prove us that the current situa-
tion of the human affairs is nothing definitive, and that 
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history has been populated by examples of other possibili-
ties, however ephemeral and imperfect they might have 
been. Through historical reconstruction, we give life 
again to these possibilities, and perhaps, can inspire a 
transformation of reality. In absence of any alternative, 
such thought proves itself to be the most political act we 
are able to perform. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 On Arendt’s reading of Plato and, more generally, on the relationship 
between philosophy and politics, see M. ABENSOUR, Against the Sove-
reignty of Philosophy over Politics: Arendt’s Reading of Plato’s Cave 
Allegory, in Social Research, vol. 74, n. 4 (Winter 2007), pp. 955 – 982; 
D. VILLA, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1995; B. PAREKH, Hannah Arendt and the 
Search for a New Political Philosophy, Macmillan, London, 198; F. M. 
DOLAN, "Arendt on Philosophy and Politics", in D. VILLA, ed., The 
Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2001. 
2 H. ARENDT, The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1958, p. 28. 
3 For a survey, see A. O. HIRSCHMAN, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perver-
sity, Futility, Jeopardy, The Belknap Press, Cambridge, Massachussets, 
1991. 
4 M. MONTI, Intervista sull’Italia in Europa, Laterza, Bari, 1998, p. 84. 
5 Arendt’s conception of politics has been the subject of a great number 
of studies. Among them, see C. CALHOUN, J. MCGOWAN, eds. Hannah 
Arendt and the Meaning of Politics, University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis, 1997; M. CANOVAN, The Political Thought of Hannah 
Arendt, J. M. Dent, London, 1974; S. DOSSA, The Public Realm and The 
Public Self: The Political Theory of Hannah Arendt, Wilfred Laurier 
University Press,Waterloo, Ontario, 1988; M. GOTTSEGEN, The Political 
Thought of Hannah Arendt, State University of New York Press, Al-
bany, NY, 1993; M. PASSERIN D’ENTRÈVES, The Political Philosophy of 
Hannah Arendt, Routledge, New York and London, 1994; E. YOUNG-
BRUEHL, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World, Yale University Press, 
New Haven 1982. 
6  H. ARENDT, The Human Condition, p. 106. 
7 ARISTOTLE, Politics, I, 1252a. 
8 H. ARENDT, The Human Condition, p. 139. 
9 See P. BOWEN-MOORE, Hannah Arendt’s Philosophy of Natality, 
Macmillan. London 1989. 
10 H. ARENDT, The Human Condition, p. 178. 
11 I. KANT, Was heißt sich im denken orientieren, in KANTs gesammelte 
Schriften, Bd 8, hrsg. von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaf-
ten,  G. Reimer, Berlin, 1923, p. 8. 
12 H. ARENDT, Truth and politics, in The New Yorker, February 25, 
1967, Daniel REMNICK, New York, p. 54. On this topic see also L. 
BRADSHAW, Acting and Thinking: The Political Thought of Hannah 
Arendt, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1989. 
13 I. KANT, Kritik der Urteilskraft, in KANTs gesammelte Schriften, Bd 
5, hrsg. von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,  G. Rei-
mer, Berlin, 1913, p. 237. 
14 Arendt’s reading of Kant’s theory of reflexive judgment as fitter than 
his political thought for evaluating politics was developed in her Lectu-
res on Kant’s Political Philosophy, University of Chicago Press, Chica-
go 1982. See G. KAPLAN, C. KESSLER, eds., Hannah Arendt: Thinking, 
Judging, Freedom, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, Sidney, 1989; J. NE-
DELSKY, R. BEINER, eds, Judgment, Imagination, and Politics: Themes 
from Kant and Arendt, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, New York, 
2001; M. PASSERIN D’ENTREVES, Arendt’s theory of Judgment, in D. 
Villa, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2001 
15 H. ARENDT, The Human Condition, p. 175. 
16 H. ARENDT, Truth and Politics, p. 62. 
17 H. ARENDT, The Human Condition, pp. 45 – 46. 
18 PLATO, Protagoras, 322 b – e. 
19 H. ARENDT, The Life of the Mind, Harcourt, Orlando, 1977 – 1978, p. 
143. 
20 PLATO, The Republic, 4844b. 
21 ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics, 1141b. 
22 H. ARENDT, The Life of the Mind, p. 81. 
23 H. ARENDT, Philosophy and Politics, p. 81. 
24 PLATO, The Laws, 716 c – d. 
25 H. ARENDT, Philosophy and Politics, p. 96. 
 
 
26 PLATO, The Republic, 488 d – 489a. 
27 H. ARENDT, The Human Condition, p. 247. 
28 Arendt’s account of this resurgence in modern times is to be found in 
On Revolution, Viking Press, New York, 1973. See also S. BENHABIB, 
The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt, Sage Publications, London, 
1996; J. ISAAC, Arendt, Camus and Modern Rebellion, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1992; A. WELLMER, Arendt on Revolution in D. 
VILLA, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2001. 
29 For criticism, see for example H. J. HOBSBAWN, Hannah Arendt on 
Revolution, in Id., Revolutionaries, The New Press, New York, 2001. 
30 H. ARENDT, The Human Condition, pp. 194 – 195. 
31 H. ARENDT, The Life of the Mind, pp 53 – 68. 
32 I. KANT, Zum ewigen Frieden, in KANTs gesammelte Schriften, Bd 8, 
hrsg. von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, G. Reimer, 
Berlin, 1923, p. 378; Toward Perpetual Peace, in Practical Philosophy, 
translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1996. 
